

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00507 01 OF 02 131403Z

45

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /086 W

----- 053412

R 131250Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0772

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0507

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FURTHER NATO ACTION ON THE
EASTERN FORCE FREEZE PROPOSAL

1. THE ALLIES WILL BE FACED, IMMEDIATELY UPON RESUMPTION
OF THE VIENNA TALKS AT THE END OF JANUARY, WITH THE
PROBLEM OF HOW TO COPE FURTHER WITH THE EASTERN FREEZE
PROPOSAL. THE PRESENT ALLIED POSITION IS THAT THEY ARE
STUDYING THIS PROPOSAL BUT ARE SKEPTICAL ABOUT IT
BECAUSE THERE IS NO AGREED DATA ON WHICH IT WOULD BE BASED
AND BECAUSE IT WOULD ESTABLISH NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. THE
USG HAS OPPOSED THE FREEZE BUT SOME ALLIES APPEAR TO WANT
TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT IT, CLAIMING THAT THEY MAY COME UNDER
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00507 01 OF 02 131403Z

PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC OPINION PRESSURE. WE DOUBT

THAT THIS CLAIM WILL BE BORNE OUT BY PUBLIC REACTION WHEN, AS IS PROBABLE, THE EAST LEAKS NEWS OF ITS PROPOSAL. PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE MBFR PROJECT IS LOW AND THE WEST HAS A GOOD CASE AGAINST THE PPRESENT EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL.

2. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN THE FREEZE AND WILL MAKE PERSISTENT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE IT. IF THEY SUCCEEDED, THEY WOULD GAIN TWO THINGS: CONTROLS OVER WESTERN EUROPEAN, PARTICULARLY THE FEDERAL GERMAN, FORCES WITHOUT ANY REDUCTIONS, AND A SPECIFIC STEP IN THE TROOP REDUCTION FIELD TO MEET THEIR OWN PUBLICLY STATED REQUIREMENT OF SOME ACTION IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BY 1975. THE WEST IN TURN WOULD LOSE THE LEVERAGE OF SOVIET INTEREST IN CONTROLS OVER THE WESTERN EUROPEAN AND FEDERAL GERMAN FORCES TO APPLY TOWARDS EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF OUR OWN REDUCTION PLAN. IN ADDITION, WHATEVER PRESSURES THERE MAY NOW BE ON THE SOVIETS TO MAKE SPECIFIC PROGRESS IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE PENDING ALL-EUROPEAN AND SOVIET PARTY CONGRESSES WOULD BE LOST.

3. OUR ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIET NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA MAY BE UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO PRODUCE RESULTS IS STRENGTHENED BY SOVIET BEHAVIOR AT THE DECEMBER 12 PLENARY. DEPARTING FROM HIS PREPARED REMARKS, SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE KHLESTOV HEATEDLY REBUTTED THE SUGGESTION CONTAINED IN US PLENARY STATEMENT THAT THE EAST APPEARED MORE INTERESTED IN SMALL INTERIM MEASURES THAN IN SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS (SEE SEPTTEL).

4. CURRENT NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP ON THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSALS STATES THAT "THE QUESTION OF A FORMAL ALLIED RESPONSE IS STILL UNDER STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE." AT BRITISH AND GERMAN INITIATIVE, THE END-OF-ROUND REPORT APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP ON DECEMBER 12 (SEE SEPTTEL) REQUESTS FURTHER NAC GUIDANCE ON THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, FOR USE IN A PLENARY STATEMENT EARLY DURING THE NEXT ROUND. WE ASSUME, THEREFORE, THAT THE NAC WILL REQUEST THE SPC TO PREPARE A PAPER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00507 01 OF 02 131403Z

ON THE BASIS OF WHICH NAC WILL APPROVE FURTHER GUIDANCE.

5. THE BASIC ISSUE WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL BE ADDRESSED IN SUCH A PAPER IS THE TACTICAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THE ALLIES SHOULD DEFINITELY REJECT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD PUT FORWARD A FORMAL COUNTERPROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES

ALREADY FORESHADOWED IN THE CURRENT NAC GUIDANCE. WE BELIEVE ASSUMING THAT THE EASTERN POSITION AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEXT ROUND IS AS NEGATIVE ON THE QUESTION OF DATA AND NATIONAL CEILINGS AS THE REPLY GIVEN IN THE DEC 10 INFORMAL, THAT EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DEFINITELY REJECTED. TO PUT FORWARD A COUNTER PROPOSAL WOULD MOVE THE NEGOTIATION ONTO GROUND HIGHLY FAVORABLE TO THE EAST. IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE ALLIES HAD ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE THE IDEA OF A FORCE FREEZE WITHOUT REDUCTIONS AND CONTRACTED TO TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT ON IT. NEGOTIATION WOULD THEN ONLY BE ON THE CONDITIONS ADDED BY THE WEST, AND WESTERN PARLIAMENTARY AND PUBLIC CAPACITY TO SUPPORT THESE OBJECTIONS AS GROUNDS FOR NOT ACCEPTING THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

6. THE PRELIMINARY EASTERN RESPONSE TO THE ALLIED CRITICISMS OF THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, MADE AT THE DECEMBER 10 INFORMAL, WAS COMPLETELY UNFORTHCOMING. THE EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES INSISTED THAT A FREEZE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO IMPOSE NATIONAL CEILINGS AND THEY REJECTED THE CONCEPT THAT A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON DATA WAS A NECESSARY CONDITION OF ANY NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

7. THE EAST MIGHT MAINTAIN THIS POSITION FOR SOME TIME, CALCULATING THAT THE ALLIES ARE UNDER SOME PRESSURE. HOWEVER, THE ALLIES CANNOT DEPEND ON THIS. WE THINK IT IS POSSIBLE THAT -- IF EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES FEEL THEMSELVES UNDER SOME PRESSURE TO GET AN AGREEMENT -- THEY MIGHT IN TIME MOVE TO ACCOMMODATE ALLIED REQUIREMENTS ON DATA AND NATIONAL CEILINGS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00507 01 OF 02 131403Z

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00507 02 OF 02 131350Z

45

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 EUR-12 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /086 W

----- 053284

R 131250Z DEC 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0773

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0507

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

TO A DEGREE THAT WOULD MAKE IT FAR MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE ALLIES TO SUSTAIN THEIR OBJECTIONS TO A FREEZE, PARTICULARLY VIS A VIS THEIR OWN PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY OPINION. IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT AGREE NOT TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES ABOVE THE FIGURE PUT FOWARD BY THE ALLIES AS DESCRIBING THE CURRENT EASTERN FORCE LEVEL (925,000), THOUGH WITHOUT ACKNOWLEDGING WHETHER THIS FIGURE WAS CORRECT OR NOT, OR MAKE APPARENT CONCESSIONS ON NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE FREEZE ONLY.

8. TO AVOID SUCH A DEVELOPMENT, WHICH COULD PLACE THE ALLIES IN AN AWKWARD NEGOTIATING SITUATION, WE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00507 02 OF 02 131350Z

BELIEVE THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD DEFINITELY REJECT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL AT THE OUTSET OF THE NEW ROUND. AS STATED ABOVE, WE DOUBT THAT THE EAST WILL SUCCEED IN AROUSING SIGNIFICANT WESTERN PUBLIC INTEREST IN

A FREEZE, AND BELIEVE THAT THIS LACK OF INTEREST WILL PROBABLY BE MANIFEST BY LATE JANUARY IF THE EAST HAS LEAKED ITS PROPOSAL. WITH THE EAST -- AND ALSO, AS NECESSARY -- WITH THE WESTERN PUBLIC, THE ALLIES CAN

ADOPT THE DEFENSIBLE POSTURE THAT THE MAIN BUSINESS OF THE VIENNA TALKS IS TO NEGOTIATE REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES DO NOT OPPOSE A FREEZE AS SUCH, BUT BELIEVE THAT A FREEZE SHOULD BE COMBINED WITH REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES COULD POINT OUT THAT EASTERN RESPONSES TO WESTERN QUESTIONS ON THE FREEZE HAVE BEEN WHOLLY NEGATIVE AND, AFTER STUDY, THE ALLIES HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE ALLIES HAVE MADE A FREEZE PROPOSAL OF THEIR OWN IN CONNECTION WITH REDUCTIONS, AND THEY CONSIDER THAT THE COMBINATION OF FREEZE AND REDUCTIONS THEY HAVE PROPOSED REPRESENTS A MUCH MORE PRODUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE CENTRAL TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAN THE EASTERN APPROACH.

9. WE RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON PROVIDE USNATO WITH A DRAFT STUDY ALONG THE ABOVE LINES WHICH SHOULD INCLUDE THE DRAFT TEXT OF COUNCIL GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP, SO THAT USNATO WILL BE IN A POSITION TO MAKE A TIMELY INPUT TO THE ANTICIPATED SPC STUDY. SUCH A STUDY SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN TIME TO PERMIT NAC GUIDANCE TO REACH VIENNA NO LATER THAN JANUARY 31.

RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MILITARY CAPABILITIES, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, PUBLIC ATTITUDES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 DEC 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00507
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740362-0890
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741237/aaaabflq.tel
Line Count: 247
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FURTHER NATO ACTION ON THE EASTERN FORCE FREEZE PROPOSAL
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005